The Jakarta Post, April 18, 2008
After ten years have passed since Indonesia started democratization process following the breakdown of the New Order authoritarianism, a feeling of disappointment, dissatisfaction, and disillusion is widely shared among many Indonesians pertaining to the role of democracy in improving the condition of the nation. Despite substantial changes in the political system that allows the people to voice their demands openly and expressively, the fact that multi socioeconomic problems such as poverty, lack of public security and safety, poor public services, and so forth are still prevalent casts a conviction that the presence of democracy has not contributed to alleviating these vivid predicaments, which have been around since the monetary crisis plunged the country into unending turmoil. Living in a despairing situation like this could evoke one to dismiss democracy.
From a sociological view, however, what we see in Indonesia today is not so much the failure of democratic system as many would suggest but rather the failure of the state to perform its duty of serving the public interests and needs. The malfunctioning of the state elements to provide minimum level of public services in various sectors and structures indicates the condition of weak state characterized by deteriorating organizational and institutional capacities.
Australian observer of Indonesia Harold Crouch argues that the weak condition of the post-Suharto state is mostly caused by the abrupt disappearance of patrimonial structures that heavily underpinned Suharto’s power for three decades. Once the regime fell down, the state institution underwent unprecedented destabilization that consequently led to deformation of authority structures cracking from the central government in Jakarta all the way down to local bureaucracy.
Adding to Crouch’s observation is a set of structural changes which unintendedly disrupt the system of authority held by the central state since democratic principles were materialized. The first of these is the shift from one party to multiparty system in which the dominance of the ruling Golkar was challenged by the entry of other political parties previously suppressed during the New Order. This creates a fragmented politics marked by vigorous struggles over power of the state among different political groups bearing different ideologies and agendas. As the operation of the state is controlled by more than one politically driven entities each of which has different, often contradictory, interests, it is difficult for the state apparatus to deliver public goods under coherent planning. Within such strife, effectively coordinated policies are difficult to achieve since policies are drawn towards mere interests of those seizing government agencies.
Producing similarly disruptive effects to the central state is the ongoing process of decentralization. Starting in 2002 with intention to empower regional governments, decentralization appears only to reduce authority of the central government without significant development of capacity on the side of local governments. The results, as many observers have reported, have been paradoxical in which more financial and political resources transferred from Jakarta to local governments are used by local elites to fulfill their own material interests sometimes with stark demonstration to their own constituents.
The imposition of neoliberal agendas on a variety of development policies is another factor contributing to the downgrading process of the state’s capacities. This has taken place ever since Indonesia was compelled to embrace a neoliberal paradigm brought in by international financial institutions, i.e. IMF and the World Bank. The intervention of these institutions in a number of strategic public sectors such as mining, telecommunication, infrastructure, and education were meant to increase the efficiency of the government operation through the application of market mechanism in public management. The outcome of this overly capitalistic approach is sadly the opposite as it reduces the opportunity for the state to enhance its capacities by taking away their jobs to the global market system ruled by multinational corporations. Thus instead of creating efficient management of public goods, neoliberal policies are inclined to worsen the crisis in public sectors, widening the gap between the state and the people it is supposed to serve.
Yet, our observation is incomplete if we overlook the impact of corruption to the state, an enormous cost that cannot be underestimated. Underlining three aforementioned factors that instantly cause the state to weaken does not necessarily mean that corruption is less damaging. We certainly need to keep in mind that widespread corruption, particularly in all level of bureaucracy, no doubt has the most harmful effects on the state capacity. The commitment of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to combat corruption must be appreciated but also criticized. Most of the efforts to eradicate corruption cases are placed on highly profiled cases involving elite officials in executive and legislative bodies. It seems that these anti-corruption measures are undertaken with a view that neglects the “institutionalized” corruption in bureaucratic organizations due to outdated culture of bureaucracy inherited from the New Order. This sort of culture renders the state inefficient, burdensome, and lack of innovation and creativity. From this point of view, corruption is actually the effect rather than the cause, and to overcome the problem requires a whole systemic reform of bureaucratic organization incorporating meritocracy, transparency, and professional norms.
On the last note is democracy. Except neoliberal agendas, all phenomena described above, i.e. fragmented politics and decentralized authority are a corollary of democratization process. They were in fact part of the reform agenda demanded by pro-reform activists from the outset. But we need not blame democracy for what these structural changes have caused to the state. Democracy is both process and product, and fragmentation and decentralization underway are the path to build a better democratic system that cannot be achieved overnight. Just because democratic transition has no beneficial effects yet to the betterment of people’s lives does not mean that democracy has failed and that we need to go back to an authoritarian system. Two explanations for that.
First, a democratic change along with new institutional settings it delivers takes some time to work effectively so as to create a prosperous civil society. The reason why they are not working well now is because the old paradigm and individuals of Suharto’s regime are still present and seek to recapture the state power. Only the force of democracy can push the remnants of New Order autocracy away from ruling the country back.
Second, reestablishing an authoritarian government is unrealistic because it does not conform to contemporary political conditions whereby democracy has become the foundation of our political system. The foreseeable option Indonesia has in hand is to push more and more participatory democracy in all fields of public life. This is the only way to strengthen the state that requires a big role of civil society. At the end of the day, it is a mutual relationship between the state and society that what Indonesia needs to reach a better future. So let us celebrate our democracy and never let it taken away by archaic minds.
